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UNDERSTANDING MCCONNELL V. FEC AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTION OF CORPORATE SPEECH
Thomas R. McCoy*
INTRODUCTION
In order to understand the constitutional issues presented to the
Supreme Court in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission' and to
appreciate fully the doctrinal implications of the Court's results in that
case, one must first understand the Court's pre-McConnell campaign
finance jurisprudence.2 The primary opinion for the majority in Mc-
Connell reasons from and expands the application of various "rules"
abstracted from pre-McConnell cases without any explicit reliance on
or reference to the underlying constitutional methodology that pro-
duced the results from which the rules were abstracted. On the cen-
tral question regarding the appropriate level of constitutional
protection for the speech of corporate entities, the majority invoked
and expanded on one authoritative thread of pre-McConnell jurispru-
dence 3 that was demonstrably inconsistent with a second thread of
pre-McConnell jurisprudence, 4 which appeared to many to be equally
authoritative. Unfortunately for doctrinal clarity, the majority articu-
lated and implemented its choice between these two inconsistent doc-
trinal threads with no explicit rejection or even acknowledgement of
the opposite thread. Thus, to fully understand and evaluate either the
primary majority opinion or any of the dissenting opinions in McCon-
nell, one must understand the analytical methodology of the pre-Mc-
Connell cases, the rules produced by that methodology on the facts of
those pre-McConnell cases, the apparent inconsistency in the Court's
pre-McConnell jurisprudence, and the unacknowledged doctrinal step
* Professor of Law, Tarkington Chair of Teaching Excellence, Vanderbilt University Law
School.
1. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
2. The conflict between campaign finance regulations and the Constitution stems from the
First Amendment, which provides in relevant part: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
3. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
4. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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taken by the majority in McConnell on the question of constitutional
protection for corporate speech.
This Article seeks to accomplish two closely related objectives.
First, this Article presents a comprehensible picture of the Court's
pre-McConnell jurisprudence with a specific focus on the underlying
analytical methodology that produced the pre-McConnell rules. In
the course of this careful review of the pre-McConnell jurisprudence,
this Article dispels the commonly held notion that the seminal deci-
sion in Buckley v. Valeo5 contains internal inconsistencies and relies
on unsound and unworkable conceptual distinctions. This review of
the pre-McConnell jurisprudence also isolates and precisely identifies
the single post-Buckley doctrinal inconsistency that was responsible
for confusing legislators, courts, and other participants throughout the
debate about the constitutionality of campaign finance restrictions. 6
Second, this Article traces the McConnell majority's treatment of cor-
porate political advocacy to its analytical foundation in pre-McConnell
jurisprudence, thereby allowing for an evaluation of this most signifi-
cant doctrinal step in McConnell through a manageable two-step pro-
cess. The first step is a conscious and explicit evaluation of the
soundness of the pre-McConnell doctrinal construct relied upon. The
second step is an evaluation of the soundness of the application of the
pre-McConnell doctrine to the greatly expanded regulatory program
at issue in McConnell.
5. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). The Buckley opinion is the doctrinal fountainhead of the Court's cam-
paign finance jurisprudence. Most of the basic constitutional "rules" governing the regulation of
campaign finance were articulated by the Court in Buckley or are readily deducible from Buck-
ley. See generally id.
6. Even a conscientious reviewer of the Supreme Court's pre-McConnell campaign finance
cases might well have concluded the following: (1) It was difficult to extract any doctrinal frame-
work from the cases; (2) any resulting doctrinal framework was hopelessly complex and relied on
hyper-technical distinctions that were impossible to administer consistently in the real world; and
(3) creative legal technicians could structure transactions to invoke constitutional protection and
evade regulation by exploiting the technical distinctions on which the Court's doctrinal frame-
work was based. A widespread perception of incoherence invited those with a regulatory
agenda to view all aspects of the Court's jurisprudence in this area as up-for-grabs and invited
the advancement of regulation on all fronts in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
(BCRA), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (amending the Federal Election Campaign Act
of 1971 (FECA), 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq. (2000)), in order to probe the apparently unsettled doc-
trinal limits. This Article's careful review of the Supreme Court's pre-McConnell decisions con-
cludes that a single doctrinal inconsistency produced the widespread impression that the Court's
decisions could not be abstracted into a coherent doctrinal framework.
1044 [Vol. 54:1043
UNDERSTANDING MCCONNELL V. FEC
II. THE PRE-MCCONNELL JURISPRUDENCE
A. Analytical Background
It is axiomatic that regulations intended to suppress political speech
because of hostility to its content are per se violations of the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment.7 But regulations that are
aimed at evils unrelated to the content or persuasive effect of the
speech, and that only incidentally impact speech, are subjected to
some sort of balancing. Such regulations are referred to most com-
monly as "time, place, or manner" regulations. 8 Classic examples are
noise regulations applied to all loud speakers no matter what message
is being broadcast 9 or restrictions on all billboards no matter what
message is being displayed on a particular billboard. 10 In some con-
texts, such regulations are classified as regulations of "symbolic
speech.""1
Whatever label one attaches to such regulations, those cases call for
a balancing of the state's non-speech regulatory interests in the activ-
ity against the extent of the "accidental" regulatory impact on the
speaker's ability to communicate his or her message. 12 Evaluating the
importance of the state's non-speech regulatory interest requires an
assessment of the alternative regulatory means available to the state
to accomplish its non-speech regulatory objectives with less of an acci-
dental impact on the ability of the speaker to communicate his or her
message. 13 Similarly, evaluation of the extent of the accidental impact
on the communication requires an assessment of the alternative
means available to the speaker to communicate the same message to
7. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (stating that "[i]f there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable"); accord United States
v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317 (1990); see also Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991) (declaring that "[riegulations which permit the
Government to discriminate on the basis of the content of the message cannot be tolerated
under the First Amendment" (quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984))).
8. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). The Court stated:
[T]he government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of
protected speech, provided the restrictions "are justified without reference to the con-
tent of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant gov-
ernmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information."
Id. (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
9. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949).
10. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 502 (1981).
11. E.g., Clark, 468 U.S. at 294.
12. Id.
13. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805 (1984) (citing United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
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the same audience with less of an impairment of the state's non-
speech regulatory interests. 14 Where a time-place-manner regula-
tion's impact on speech is minimal because alternative means of com-
municating the message are readily available, a modest non-speech
regulatory interest will be sufficient to justify the minimal incidental
impact on the speech. 15 Where the regulatory impact on speech is
great, however, the balancing test will take the form of "strict" or "ex-
acting" scrutiny that may require a "compelling governmental inter-
est" to justify the impact on speech.1 6
To illustrate this time-place-manner balancing calculus, consider the
application of the murder laws to the assassination of a political candi-
date. Even the quiet assassination of a political candidate could com-
municate a message of disapproval of that candidate to those who
know the details of the murder. A deliberately public assassination of
a political candidate could also be intended to communicate a political
message to a broad audience. But the state has an obvious regulatory
interest in the activity completely aside from whether it communicates
anything. In its simplest form, the time-place-manner balancing
calculus yields the conclusion that the state has a very strong regula-
tory interest in preventing murder, completely independent of any
communicative intent or effect associated with a particular murder.
And the state has no readily available alternative regulatory approach
that would accomplish the objectives of the murder law with less of an
accidental impact on the communicative aspects of assassinating a
candidate. On the other side of the balance, the communicative value
of assassinating a political candidate is not that high in view of the
many alternative means available to the assassin to communicate his
or her political message. And even where the communicative value of
the assassination must be assessed as high, the state's "compelling in-
terest" in protecting individuals from murder is sufficient to justify the
substantial accidental interference with the communicative aspects of
assassinating the candidate. By implementing these general principles
in the context of campaign finance, the case of Buckley v. Valeo17 es-
14. In Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983), a school
teachers' union sued the school district for allowing a rival union exclusive access to teachers'
mailboxes. After engaging in the balancing discussed earlier, the Court concluded that because
the union had alternative means of communicating with the teachers, the First Amendment was
not violated. Id. at 53-54; see also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827-28 (1974).
15. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 54.
16. See, e.g., O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
17. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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tablished the basic pre-McConnell framework for assessing the consti-
tutionality of any measures regulating campaign finance.' 8
B. Buckley and MCFL
1. First Principle: Advocacy Expenditures by Individuals
The first and most fundamental question the Buckley Court con-
fronted was presented by the argument that restrictions on the
amount of an individual's independent expenditures supporting his or
her own advocacy efforts or on the amount of a candidate's advertis-
ing expenditures coming out of his or her own personal funds should
be treated as time-place-manner regulations that only incidentally im-
pact speech and thus are subject to the balancing methodology. 19 This
argument relies on the assumption that expenditures to publish a mes-
sage are separable from the message itself in the same way that the
size and shape of a billboard are separable from any particular mes-
sage that might be displayed thereon. From this premise, it would
follow that the state may assert a regulatory interest in restricting the
expenditure, completely independent of any regulatory interest in
suppressing the speech itself. Although this argument is sound as an
abstract construct, the Court clearly and correctly rejected its applica-
tion to the regulation in Buckley.20
There were two serious problems with the state's attempt to apply
time-place-manner analysis in Buckley. First, the regulation in ques-
tion restricted the use of expenditures only when the subject of the
communication was political.21 Identical expenditures in support of
advocacy on a different subject were not restricted. 22 This content dis-
crimination ran afoul of the Court's oft-repeated principle that time-
place-manner regulations must be content neutral. 23 Content based
time-place-manner regulations are treated as content regulations that
are per se unconstitutional. 24 Second, and more fundamental, the two
reasons offered by the state to justify the purported time-place-man-
ner restrictions on campaign expenditures revealed that the state's
regulatory interest actually was in limiting the effect of the political
18. See generally id.
19. Id. at 39-59.
20. Id. at 58-59.
21. Id. at 12-13.
22. Id.
23. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44-45, 49-51; see also cases cited supra note 7 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., Eichman, 496 U.S. 310; Johnson, 491 U.S. 397. See generally cases cited supra
note 7 and accompanying text.
2005] 1047
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speech itself, not in regulating some non-speech aspect of the commu-
nication expenditure.25
The state initially argued that the restriction on expenditures was
justified by a regulatory interest in reducing the effectiveness of
wealthy speakers, whatever their message, in order to level the play-
ing field in the marketplace of ideas for less wealthy speakers. 26 In
making this argument, the state admitted that its conscious, deliberate
purpose was the restriction of core political speech, not the pursuit of
some non-speech time-place-manner objective with an incidental ef-
fect on speech.27 Not surprisingly, the Buckley Court responded. em-
phatically that "the concept that government may restrict the speech
of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice
of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment. '28
The state's second argument was not so obviously defective. The
state argued that its restriction on an individual's expenditures used to
advance his or her advocacy efforts on behalf of a candidate was de-
signed to reduce the risk of real or perceived quid pro quo corrup-
tion.29 The state argued that once the candidate was elected, he or she
would bestow favors on the advocate as a reward for the advocate's
financial efforts on the candidate's behalf.30 This argument appears to
fit the classic time-place-manner formulation more closely because the
asserted regulatory interest is in preventing corruption, not in sup-
pressing or restraining the communication. But closer inspection
reveals that it is the amount and effectiveness of the advocacy that
presents the risk that the candidate will reward the advocate. And the
method chosen by the state to reduce that risk is a direct restriction on
the amount and effectiveness of the advocacy itself. The ultimate reg-
ulatory objective may be to eliminate the risk of real or perceived
corruption, but the deliberate, immediate objective of the regulation
in question is the restriction of core political speech, not the restric-
tion of some non-speech aspect of the communicative activity. 31
25. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45-51, 53-58.
26. Id. at 48, 54, 56.
27. Id. at 57.
28. Id. at 48-49.
29. Id. at 45, 53.
30. Id.
31. In one line of cases, the Court does seem to have allowed a similar, direct regulation of
protected speech because of its content or message when the ultimate regulatory objective was
to eliminate some undesirable "secondary effects" of the speech. In Young v. American Mini-
Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), the Court developed this secondary effects doctrine to sustain
the constitutionality of zoning laws restricting adult theaters because of their non-obscene (and
thus protected) sexual content, while not restricting similar theaters showing other content. Ac-
cording to the Court, in these secondary effects cases, direct content-discriminatory regulation of
[Vol. 54:10431048
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A restriction on expenditures that applies only to expenditures for
speech is a restriction on the speech itself. It is inconceivable that the
state would have a time-place-manner regulatory interest in sup-
pressing expenditures only for speech but not expenditures for any
other purpose. It is further inconceivable that the regulatory interest
would be entirely independent of any interest in suppressing or re-
stricting the speech itself. A true time-place-manner restriction on ex-
penditures for speech would be a restriction on all expenditures for
any purpose, including speech, in order to further a regulatory interest
in the expenditures themselves without reference to their purpose. In
such a case, the impact of the expenditure restriction on speech would
be accidental. An example of such a legitimate time-place-manner re-
striction on advocacy expenditures would be a child support decree
that prevented a candidate from spending the money on any purpose
other than child support, thus preventing the candidate from spending
the money to finance his or her campaign advocacy. In that case, the
regulatory purpose would not be the restriction of speech, so the ef-
fect of reducing the amount and effectiveness of the candidate's
speech would be accidental rather than deliberate, and the restriction
on speech would be analyzed using the time-place-manner
methodology.
Thus, the first principle from Buckley can be stated as follows: Reg-
ulatory restrictions on an individual's expenditures for his or her own
political advocacy (while other individual expenditures for other pur-
poses are not regulated) are per se violations of the Free Speech
Clause.32 It is this fundamental holding that many regulation advo-
otherwise protected speech was permissible under a corrupted form of time-place-manner analy-
sis because the state's ultimate regulatory objective was to eliminate the gathering of undesirable
patrons and the resulting decline in neighboring property values. Id. at 63-73. According to the
Court, the state was not restricting the speech because of a regulatory interest in suppressing the
message. Id. In fact, however, the state was deliberately suppressing the message in order to
accomplish its ultimate regulatory objective of eliminating the undesirables who would be at-
tracted by that message and not by other messages. Id. It is difficult to perceive any limit on the
applicability of this secondary effects doctrine since the government's ultimate regulatory objec-
tive in every case of suppressing core political speech is the prevention of some undesirable effect
of the message. Direct suppression of the speech in and of itself is never the ultimate regulatory
objective. The ultimate regulatory objective is always the prevention of some effect that is ex-
pected to result from the message if left unrestricted. Thus, it appears that the secondary effects
doctrine, if taken seriously and applied broadly, would effectively negate all First Amendment
protection for all disfavored advocacy. Fortunately, the Court seems to have confined this doc-
trine to cases involving sexual content, an area in which the Court's doctrinal inconsistency is
notorious. For an effective analysis and critique of the secondary effects doctrine, see David L.
Hudson, Jr., The Secondary Effects Doctrine: "The Evisceration of First Amendment Freedoms",
37 WASHBURN L.J. 55 (1997).
32. See generally Buckley, 424 U.S. 1.
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DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
cates attacked directly in their persistent calls to re-examine Buckley.
And it is this fundamental holding that many regulation advocates and
regulation drafters have sought to evade by exploiting perceived am-
biguities in the Court's post-Buckley doctrinal pronouncements.
2. Second Principle: Campaign Contributions
Having established the fundamental principle that restricting the
use of an individual's money in advancing his or her own advocacy is
indistinguishable, for First Amendment purposes, from restricting the
speech itself, the Buckley Court also addressed the constitutionality of
restrictions on campaign contributions-the contribution of one's
money to a political candidate to advance that candidate's advocacy.33
Here the time-place-manner methodology applied perfectly. The act
of contributing money to a political candidate rarely is intended to
communicate (i.e., "speak") one's support for that candidate to a
broad audience.34 It is of course true that those who happen to know
of one's contribution to a political candidate will understand that ac-
tion to be an endorsement of the candidate. And in rare circum-
stances, a deliberately public contribution to a candidate can be
intended to communicate to a broad audience an endorsement of the
candidate. The time-place-manner balancing analysis is applicable
here, however, because the state in restricting contributions is not
seeking to limit the communicative effect of the act of contributing.35
Rather, the state is restricting the act of transferring money to the
candidate because that action creates a substantial risk of real or per-
ceived quid pro quo corruption, whether or not the action communi-
cates anything to the marketplace of ideas.36
In the case of campaign contributions, the state has an interest in
preventing individuals from purchasing political favors from future of-
fice holders (i.e., bribery), whether the contribution is intended to
communicate endorsement to a broader audience and whether it has
such a communicative effect. Although the state has the same ulti-
mate regulatory objective as in restricting individual advocacy expend-
itures to promote a candidate, the state has no proximate objective in
restricting the amount or effectiveness of an individual's political ad-
vocacy. In contrast, the immediate regulatory objective of the state in
restricting individual advocacy expenditures is to reduce or disable the
communicative effect of the expenditure in advancing the speech.
33. Id. at 23-38.
34. Id. at 20-22.
35. Id. at 21.
36. Id. at 26-29.
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Applying the general time-place-manner balancing framework, the
Buckley Court concluded that regulating campaign contributions to
candidates passed constitutional review because the state's non-
speech regulatory interest was significant while the impact on the con-
tributor's "speech" was minimal.37 The key to this result in Buckley
was the Court's conclusion that usually very little speech (in the sense
of addressing the marketplace of ideas) is involved in the act of mak-
ing a campaign contribution to a candidate. 38 Further, contributors
seeking to communicate their endorsements of a candidate have nu-
merous equally effective alternative means of communicating their
views on the candidate. 39 Since the Court's analysis is a straightfor-
ward application of classic time-place-manner methodology, the result
is entirely sound. This result can be summarized as the second princi-
ple in Buckley: Campaign contributions to candidates are not pro-
tected by the Free Speech Clause.
3. Third Principle: Coordinated Expenditures
The Buckley Court then confronted the argument that constitution-
ally permissible restrictions on campaign contributions to candidates
could be circumvented easily by having the would-be contributor di-
rectly fund campaign ads according to explicit directions from the can-
didate or the candidate's staff.4 0 As a response to this practical
reality, the Court is generally understood to have concluded that such
"coordinated expenditures" should be treated, for constitutional pur-
poses, as unprotected contributions rather than as protected "inde-
pendent expenditures. '41 Described this way, the Court's holding that
an individual's coordinated expenditures can be regulated appears in-
consistent with its first holding in Buckley that regulating individual
political advocacy expenditures is a per se violation of the Free Speech
37. Id. at 28-29.
38. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.
39. Id. at 20-21. The Court explained:
A contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his
views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the support. The quantity of
communication by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of his
contribution, since the expression rests solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of
contributing. At most, the size of the contribution provides a very rough index of the
intensity of the contributor's support for the candidate. A limitation on the amount of
money a person may give to a candidate or campaign organization thus involves little
direct restraint on his political communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of
support evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor's
freedom to discuss candidates and issues.
Id. (footnote omitted).
40. Id. at 46-47.
41. Id. at 46.
10512005]
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Clause. But this apparent inconsistency is resolved by a more careful
analysis and description of the Court's holding. The first holding in
Buckley is that the state cannot address the problem of quid pro quo
corruption (an ultimate non-speech goal) by restricting the amount of
an individual's expenditures for his or her own advocacy in favor of a
candidate (a proximate speech-suppressing goal). 42 Thus, a restriction
on coordinated expenditures by an individual must be understood not
as a restriction on the expenditures, but rather as a restriction on the
action of "coordinating" the speech with the candidate or the candi-
date's staff by meeting with the candidate or staff to obtain instruc-
tions on how and where to make the advocacy expenditure.
The difference is not mere formalism. The state may not pursue its
ultimate regulatory objective of reducing quid pro quo corruption by
pursuing the intermediate objective of restricting the amount or effec-
tiveness of an individual's political speech. But the state can pursue
its ultimate non-speech regulatory objective by restricting the non-
speech elements of the individual's actions (the coordinating activi-
ties) that give rise to a risk of quid pro quo corruption beyond that
presented by the amount of the advocacy itself. Regulating the con-
tact with the candidate or the candidate's staff to "coordinate" the
expenditure may have the effect of reducing the overall impact of the
individual's speech on behalf of the candidate. But reducing the effec-
tiveness of the speech is neither the ultimate nor the intermediate goal
of a regulation restricting coordination. Thus, the constitutionality of
the accidental impact on the individual's speech is appropriately
judged by the time-place-manner balancing methodology.
Viewed through the time-place-manner analytical lens, the Buckley
Court's holding on coordinated expenditures was a holding regarding
the constitutionality of regulating coordination, not regulating ex-
penditures or speech. The Court held that the significant regulatory
interest in preventing actual and perceived quid pro quo corruption
outweighed the relatively slight impact on the individual's speech on
behalf of a candidate, which would result from the individual's inabil-
ity to consult with the candidate on when, where, and how to speak. 43
In time-place-manner terms, the alternative available to the speaker
was to engage in the same speech with the same expenditure of re-
sources but without contact with the candidate or staff.44 Because this
alternative method was not much less effective than the "coordinated"
method, the state's regulatory interest in preventing the actual and
42. Id. at 19, 20, 45-48.
43. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46-47.
44. Id.
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apparent corruption attendant on the activity of coordinating was suf-
ficient to justify the regulation of that activity under a classic time-
place-manner analysis.
Misreading Buckley as a holding that some individual expenditures
for speech are speech and cannot be regulated while other individual
expenditures that are identical in scope and impact can be regulated
(i.e., those that are "coordinated") introduces a logical inconsistency
into Buckley itself. More importantly, misconstruing the Buckley
opinion as holding that the expenditures can be regulated if they are
coordinated, rather than a holding that coordination activities can be
regulated, would allow regulatory advocates to assert that expendi-
tures advancing one's own advocacy in support of a candidate can be
considered coordinated, and thus regulatable, even without any con-
tact between the speaker and representatives of the candidate. Rely-
ing on an expansive, commonsense, out-of-context meaning of the
term "coordinated," one could argue that any effort by an individual
to maximize the impact of his or her own expenditures and speech by
choosing to use media or to address audiences not reached by the can-
didate's own efforts constitutes a form of "coordination," as the term
is commonly understood. In other words, conscious choices by an in-
dividual to assure that his or her advocacy efforts compliment the can-
didate's own efforts, rather than wastefully duplicating the candidate's
efforts, could be considered "coordinated" and subject to regulation
even without any contact between the individual and the candidate's
campaign organization. Such an expansive, out-of-context use of the
term "coordinated" appears to underlie the Bipartisan Campaign Fi-
nance Reform Act's instruction to the Federal Election Commission
(FEC) to draft new rules expanding the regulatory definition of "coor-
dinated" to ban individual expenditures even when there is no contact
at all between the individual and campaign personnel.45 Anyone con-
templating a large expenditure to advance his or her advocacy on be-
half of a candidate will judiciously invest in advocacy that maximizes
its impact by complimenting rather than duplicating the candidate's
campaign efforts. As a result, all large independent expenditures
45. The relevant section of the BCRA stated: "The Federal Election Commission shall pro-
mulgate new regulations on coordinated communications paid for by persons other than candi-
dates, authorized committees of candidates, and party committees. The regulations shall not
require agreement or formal collaboration to establish coordination." BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-
155, tit. II, § 214(c), 116 Stat. 81 (2002). Despite this broad directive, the Federal Election Com-
mission (FEC) implemented the following limited definition of coordination: "Coordinated
means made in cooperation, consultation or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, a
candidate, a candidate's authorized committee, or their agents, or a political party committee or
its agents." 11 C.F.R. § 109.20(a) (2004).
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would effectively qualify as coordinated and thus be subject to regula-
tion under this expansive notion of coordination. 46  This result is
avoided, however, if Buckley is understood as holding that the activity
of contact with the candidate or staff, rather than the expenditures,
can be regulated.
It is true, of course, that a candidate unavoidably will be aware of
large expenditures for advocacy on the candidate's behalf made by
individuals acting entirely on their own. And there will be a conse-
quent inclination to "reward" such efforts through the use of political
favors or access that appear to be (or actually are) quid pro quo cor-
ruption, even though no "deal" was struck in advance. In other
words, the state can assert exactly the same regulatory interest in ex-
actly the same amount to justify both the regulation of coordinated
expenditures and the regulation of independent expenditures. Thus,
some commentators have concluded that Buckley is internally incon-
sistent in allowing the regulation of coordinated expenditures and not
the regulation of independent expenditures. That conclusion, how-
ever, overlooks the critical fact that in an independent expenditure
case it is the speech itself being regulated, while in a coordinated ex-
penditure case it is the coordinating activity that is being regulated. 47
The core holding in Buckley is that this regulatory interest, and implic-
itly any other regulatory interest, cannot justify the direct and deliber-
ate suppression of an individual's "independent" political advocacy in
46. For example, any individuals or organizations contemplating the purchase of television
time to promote their preferred candidate naturally would inquire of the local stations about the
time slots already scheduled for coverage by the candidate's own advertising and would then
direct their expenditures to underserved time slots. Under the commonsense expansive notion
of "coordination" apparently contemplated in the BCRA, such independent expenditures could
then be regulated.
47. See, e.g., David Schultz, Revisiting Buckley v. Valeo: Eviscerating the Line Between Candi-
date Contributions and Independent Expenditures, 14 J.L. & POL. 33, 48-50 (1998). Professor
Schultz argues that the compelling interest in reducing corruption and the appearance of corrup-
tion applies with equal force to cases of independent expenditures and cases of coordinated
expenditures:
"Let us suppose that each of two brothers spends $1 million on TV spot announce-
ments that he has individually prepared and in which he appears, urging the election for
the same named candidate in identical words. One brother has sought and obtained
the approval of the candidate; the other has not. The former may validly be prosecuted
under § 608(e) [of the FECA]; under the Court's view, the latter may not, even though
the candidate could scarcely help knowing about and appreciating the expensive favor.
For constitutional purposes it is difficult to see the difference between the two
situations."
Id. at 49 (quoting Justice Byron White in Buckley, 424 U.S. at 261). In the hypothetical cited by
Professor Schultz, and originally posited by Justice Byron White, the reason that one brother
may be prosecuted while the other may not is that the first brother has engaged in an activity
that can constitutionally be regulated: coordination. Id. at 50-51. The other engaged in pure
speech. Id.
1054 [Vol. 54:1043
UNDERSTANDING MCCONNELL V. FEC
support of a candidate. 48 But under time-place-manner analysis, that
same regulatory interest can easily justify restrictions on coordinating
activities where the restrictions have minimal impact on the advocacy
itself.49 Thus, the third principle from Buckley should be understood
as: While restrictions on an individual's expenditures to advance that
individual's own advocacy on behalf of a candidate are per se viola-
tions of the Free Speech Clause, the individual can be prohibited from
contacting the candidate or staff to coordinate the individual's advo-
cacy and expenditures with the desires of the candidate.
4. Fourth Principle: Advocacy Expenditures by Political Advocacy
Groups
Conceptually (as distinguished from chronologically) the Court's
next step after Buckley was Federal Election Commission v. Massachu-
setts Citizens for Life (MCFL),50 in which the Court concluded that
the principles announced in Buckley for the constitutional protection
of an individual's advocacy expenditures apply with equal force to
protect advocacy expenditures by nonprofit corporations formed for
the purpose of political advocacy. 51 If this case had followed Buckley
immediately in chronological sequence, the result would have been so
entirely predictable as to be nearly unremarkable. In a venerable line
of cases commonly (and inaccurately) referred to as "freedom of asso-
ciation" cases, 52 the Court established that group political speech is
constitutionally protected in the same way and to the same degree
that individual political speech is protected. When the Court in Buck-
ley decided that individual expenditures for political advocacy are
constitutionally indistinguishable from the speech itself, simple logic
dictated that this principle would apply to expenditures by political
associations for political advocacy. Thus, if one ignores the cases that
48. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45-51.
49. Id. at 46-47.
50. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
51. See generally id.
52. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v.
Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). In
subsequent cases, the Court explained that there is no First Amendment freedom simply to
"associate." According to these later cases, the early freedom of association cases should be
understood as affording First Amendment protection for a freedom to associate for purposes of
political advocacy-such as a freedom of "group speech" that is entitled to the same level of
protection as individual speech. Merely associating for purposes other than speech is entitled to
no more constitutional protection than all other non-fundamental individual liberties. See Bd. of
Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609
(1984).
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intervened in the chronological sequence between Buckley and
MCFL, MCFL was a simple next logical step, producing the fourth
operative principle of pre-McConnell jurisprudence: Advocacy ex-
penditures by incorporated political advocacy groups are covered by
the same constitutional principles that protect the advocacy expendi-
tures of individuals.53
5. Fifth Principle: Individual Contributions to Political Advocacy
Groups
Similarly, simple logic suggests that individual contributions of
money to associations formed for purposes of political advocacy are
inherently part of the individual's protected participation in the asso-
ciation's speech. Thus, the fifth operative principle of pre-McConnell
jurisprudence is a logical implication of MCFL and the "freedom of
association" cases: Individual contributions to incorporated political
advocacy groups for the purposes of political advocacy are protected
to the same extent as individual expenditures for the individual's own
direct political advocacy.
C. The Bellotti Holding
In actual chronological order, the Supreme Court's next pivotal
campaign finance case after Buckley was not MCFL but First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.54 If one anticipates the decision in the
MCFL case, the broad issue in Bellotti can be neatly stated: To what
extent should the principles protecting the political advocacy expendi-
tures of individuals and incorporated political advocacy associations
be applicable to the political advocacy expenditures of for-profit busi-
ness corporations? 55 Writing for the majority, Justice Lewis Powell
unequivocally asserted that the speech of for-profit corporations was
entitled to exactly the same protection that the First Amendment pro-
vides for the speech of individuals. 56
53. See generally MCFL, 479 U.S. 238.
54. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
55. See generally id.
56. "The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does
not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individ-
ual." Id. at 777. For a vigorous and thorough attack on the basic premise of Bellotti, see Daniel
J.H. Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why Corporate Speech Is Not Free, 83 IOWA L. REV. 995
(1998). For an equally spirited defense of Bellotti, see Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasser-
man, What's Good for General Motors: Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235 (1998), or Thomas W. Joo, The Modern Corporation and Campaign
Finance: Incorporating Corporate Governance Analysis into First Amendment Jurisprudence, 79
WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (2001).
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This reading of Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in Bellotti is
confirmed by his explicit rejection of the dissenters' arguments that a
for-profit corporation is a legal abstraction constructed by the state to
serve certain economic purposes, and that, as a creation of govern-
ment, a for-profit corporation should be subject to any limitations im-
posed by government, including limitations on its ability to engage in
the political process (through advocacy or expenditures to advance its
advocacy). 57 Justice Powell's reasoning reinforced the point even fur-
ther. He asserted that it is the speech itself, and not the speaker, that
is protected by the Free Speech Clause.58 Therefore, the nature of the
speaker (whether an individual, an incorporated political advocacy as-
sociation, or a for-profit business corporation) has no bearing on the
level of constitutional protection accorded to any particular speech.
59
Thus, Bellotti appears to announce the sixth operative principle of
pre-McConnell jurisprudence: The rules of Buckley and MCFL apply
with equal force to the advocacy expenditures and contributions of
for-profit corporations. 60
Had Justice Powell simply stopped at that point, Bellotti would not
have been inconsistent in any respect with Buckley, and no element of
incoherence would have been introduced into the Court's campaign
finance jurisprudence. Applying the "rules" of Buckley (and MCFL)
to the expenditures of for-profit corporations would have been a sim-
ple and straightforward proposition. Unfortunately, Justice Powell
proceeded to offer two observations about the appropriate level of
protection for for-profit corporations. 61 Those "suggestions" either
were inconsistent with his broad holding that the speech and advocacy
expenditures of for-profit corporations received the same level of pro-
tection as the advocacy expenditures of individuals or were inconsis-
tent with Buckley's clear instructions about the level of protection to
be accorded to the expenditures of individuals. These suggestions are
the fountainhead of all the true incoherence in the Court's pre-Mc-
Connell jurisprudence. When these suggestions were picked up by
regulation advocates and implemented in subsequent cases, a funda-
mental inconsistency became firmly embedded in the Court's cam-
paign finance jurisprudence. Regulation advocates were encouraged
to view the most basic Buckley principles as open for re-examination,
and the drafters of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act
57. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 791 n.30.
58. Id. at 776-77.
59. Id. at 776-86.
60. See generally id.
61. See infra Part II.D.
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(BCRA) were encouraged to exploit the confusion by including re-
strictions that stretch both the spirit and the letter of Buckley.
D. The Bellotti "Suggestions"
1. Regulation of Corporate Candidate Advocacy Justified by the
Risk of Corruption
The "narrow," "technical," or "actual" holding in Bellotti is only
that advocacy expenditures of for-profit corporations in an issue elec-
tion (as opposed to a candidate election) are protected by the First
Amendment because only issue ads were in question in Bellotti.62 But
Justice Powell's opinion in Bellotti was written, and is widely under-
stood, as a grand, sweeping, and absolutely unequivocal pronounce-
ment that the speech of for-profit corporations (hereinafter simply
corporate speech) is protected in every context to the same extent as
the speech of individuals (and by implication, the speech of incorpo-
rated political advocacy associations). Thus, it is startling to find bur-
ied in footnote 26 of the opinion the clear suggestion that a restriction
on independent corporate speech addressing a candidate election
might be found constitutional, because: "Congress might well be able
to demonstrate the existence of a danger of real or apparent corrup-
tion in independent expenditures by corporations to influence candi-
date elections. ' 63 In making this assertion, Justice Powell seemed
oblivious to the fact that the Court in Buckley had clearly held that
the First Amendment protected independent expenditures by individ-
uals to advance their own advocacy of a candidate because the ex-
penditures are inseparable from the advocacy.64 The Buckley Court
explicitly rejected the risk of real or apparent corruption (and argua-
62. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788-92.
63. Id. at 788 n.26. The text of the critical language in footnote 26 is as follows:
The overriding concern behind the enactment of statutes such as the Federal Corrupt
Practices Act was the problem of corruption of elected representatives through the
creation of political debts. See United States v. Automobile Workers, [352 U.S. 567,]
570-575 [(1967)]; Schwartz v. Romnes, [495 F.2d 844,] 849-851 [(2d Cir. 1974)). The
importance of the governmental interest in preventing this occurrence has never been
doubted. The case before us presents no comparable problem, and our consideration
of a corporation's right to speak on issues of general public interest implies no compa-
rable right in the quite different context of participation in a political campaign for
election to public office. Congress might well be able to demonstrate the existence of a
danger of real or apparent corruption in independent expenditures by corporations to
influence candidate elections. Cf Buckley v. Valeo, [424 U.S.] at 46; Comment, The
Regulation of Union Political Activity: Majority and Minority Rights and Remedies, 126
U. Pa. L. Rev. 386, 408-10 (1977).
Id.
64. See generally Buckley, 424 U.S. 1.
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bly any other possible reason) as a justification for restricting an indi-
vidual's core political speech.
65
If one combines Justice Powell's suggestion in footnote 26 with the
broad holding in Bellotti, that corporate speech is the constitutional
equivalent of individual speech, then the Buckley holding, that an in-
dividual's independent expenditures for either issue advocacy or can-
didate advocacy are protected, must be wrong. If one combines the
apparent broad Bellotti holding, that corporate speech is the constitu-
tional equivalent of individual speech, with the holding in Buckley,
that expenditures for an individual's candidate advocacy are protected
in spite of any risk of real or apparent corruption, then the suggestion
in footnote 26 must be wrong. Or if one accepts both Buckley and the
suggestion in footnote 26 of Bellotti, then the apparent broad holding
in Bellotti, that corporate speech is the constitutional equivalent of
individual speech, must be wrong. To re-establish doctrinal coherence
and consistency after Bellotti, the Court could have either: (a) over-
ruled Buckley's holding that independent individual expenditures for
candidate advocacy are protected; (b) overruled Bellotti's broad hold-
ing that corporate speech (and thus the inseparable expenditures for
political advocacy) is protected in exactly the same way as individual
speech (and inseparable individual expenditures for political advo-
cacy); or (c) rejected Justice Powell's suggestion in footnote 26 (which,
after all, is only dicta).
One might argue that the suggestion in footnote 26 concerning real
or apparent corruption as a justification for the regulation of corpo-
rate candidate advocacy can be distinguished from the Buckley hold-
ing protecting an individual's candidate advocacy because corporate
candidate advocacy presents a higher risk of real or apparent corrup-
tion. However, the risk of real or apparent corruption does not de-
pend on whether the advocate is an individual, an individual's
corporate alter ego, or a full scale national corporate entity. The risk
of real or apparent corruption depends on the amount of money ex-
pended to advance the advocacy and on the ability of the candidate,
once elected, to assist the economic interests of the advocate. In other
words, a regulatory interest in preventing real or apparent corruption
does not support treating corporate candidate advocacy expenditures
different from an equal candidate advocacy expenditure by an individ-
ual with financial resources equal to or exceeding those of many cor-
porations. Stated still another way, nothing about the regulatory
interest in preventing real or apparent corruption confines the sugges-
65. See generally id.
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tion in footnote 26 to corporate rather than individual advocacy ex-
penditures of an equal amount. Nothing about the corporate form of
a business organization (as distinct from the amount of financial re-
sources commanded by some corporations and by some individuals or
the ability of the candidate to advance the economic interests of some
corporations and some individuals) gives rise to a greater risk of real
or apparent corruption from corporate expenditures. If corporate ad-
vocacy expenditures are regulatable to avoid corruption, and individ-
ual advocacy expenditures in an equal amount with an identical risk of
corruption are not regulatable, it must be because the regulation of
corporate speech can be justified by a regulatory interest of a certain
magnitude while regulation of individual speech cannot be justified by
that same regulatory interest. In other words, corporate speech must
not receive the same level of constitutional protection as individual
speech, and the apparent core holding in Bellotti must be wrong.
2. Regulation Justified by the "Undue" Impact of Wealthy
Advocates
Justice Powell's second disorienting suggestion came in response to
arguments by the state that regulation of corporate expenditures for
either issue advocacy or candidate advocacy was constitutionally justi-
fied because large amounts of wealth invested in either issue advocacy
or candidate advocacy "would exert an undue influence on the out-
come of a ... vote, and-in the end-destroy the confidence of the
people in the democratic process and the integrity of government. ' 66
Justice Powell opined in response: "If appellee's arguments were sup-
ported by record or legislative findings that corporate advocacy
threatened imminently to undermine democratic processes, thereby
denigrating rather than serving First Amendment interests, these ar-
guments would merit our consideration. ' 67 If, as Justice Powell as-
serted in Bellotti, corporate political advocacy is protected to the same
extent as individual political advocacy, then Justice Powell's observa-
tion (that state arguments about disabling wealthy advocates in order
to level the playing field for less wealthy advocates "would merit our
consideration") 68 was flatly contrary to the Court's explicit and une-
quivocal rejection of any such notion in Buckley with respect to indi-
vidual advocates.
Again the inconsistency is not just technical nor merely rhetorical.
In terms of its impact on the marketplace of ideas, there is no discern-
66. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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able difference between the impact of the expenditure of a certain
sum on political advocacy by a corporate entity and the identical im-
pact of the expenditure of an identical sum on identical advocacy by
an individual.69 If the impact of wealth on public political debate is a
constitutionally sufficient justification for the regulation of a corpo-
rate advocacy expenditure, but not for the regulation of an individual
expenditure of an identical amount for identical political advocacy
with identical impact, then the reason for the distinction must not lie
in the impact of the expenditure. The reason for the distinction must
lie in the difference between wealth acquired and held in the corpo-
rate form on the one hand, and an identical amount of wealth ac-
quired and held by an individual on the other hand. In other words,
political speech by corporations, which includes the inseparable ex-
penditures to advance that speech, must not be constitutionally pro-
tected to the same extent that the Constitution protects an individual's
political speech and the inseparable expenditures to advance that
advocacy.
Justice Powell's suggestion that reducing the impact of wealth on
public political debate justifies restricting the advocacy of wealthy cor-
porations combined with the broad holding in Bellotti that corporate
speech is the constitutional equivalent of individual speech would
mean that Buckley must have been wrong in holding that the state
may not, by regulation, restrict the impact of wealthy individual advo-
cates. The broad Bellotti holding, that corporate speech is the consti-
tutional equivalent of individual speech, combined with the holding in
Buckley that expenditures for individual candidate advocacy are pro-
tected in spite of any risk of an "undue" impact of wealthy advocates,
would mean that Justice Powell must have been wrong in suggesting
that the "undue" impact of wealthy corporations would justify regula-
tion. Or Buckley combined with Justice Powell's suggestion in Bel-
lotti, that the state can regulate advocacy expenditures by wealthy
corporations, would mean that the apparent broad holding in Bellotti,
that corporate speech is the constitutional equivalent of individual
speech, must have been wrong. To re-establish doctrinal coherence
and consistency after Bellotti, the Court could have either: (a) over-
ruled Buckley's holding that independent expenditures by wealthy in-
dividuals for candidate advocacy are protected; (b) overruled Bellotti's
broad holding that corporate speech (and thus the inseparable ex-
penditures for political advocacy) are protected in exactly the same
69. See Susan W. Dana, Restrictions on Corporate Spending on State Ballot Measure Cam-
paigns: A Re-Evaluation of Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 27 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 309, 350 (2000).
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way as individual speech (and inseparable individual expenditures for
political advocacy); or (c) rejected Justice Powell's suggestion that re-
ducing the "undue" impact of wealthy corporate advocacy in public
political debate might be an acceptable constitutional justification for
restrictions on corporate advocacy expenditures (which is, like his
other suggestion, only dicta).
E. Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce
The seeds of doctrinal inconsistency planted by Justice Powell's
broad holding in Bellotti and his two suggestions in Bellotti bore fruit
in Justice Thurgood Marshall's majority opinion in Austin v. Michigan
State Chamber of Commerce.70 In Austin, the Court found constitu-
tional a restriction on independent corporate expenditures for politi-
cal advocacy in a candidate election. 71 This result effectively adopted
and implemented Justice Powell's first Bellotti suggestion. Thus, this
result either overruled the broad Bellotti holding that corporate
speech was protected to the same extent as individual speech or over-
ruled the Buckley holding that all individual expenditures for political
advocacy, including candidate advocacy, were protected.
The Court's reasoning in Austin suggests that the Court intuitively
viewed its holding as consistent with Buckley because it did not view
the wealthy corporate political advocacy at issue in Austin as constitu-
tionally equivalent to the advocacy of an equally wealthy individual.72
The key elements of the Court's reasoning in Austin are the argu-
ments that corporate advocacy expenditures are distinguishable from
individual advocacy expenditures of identical amounts because of con-
stitutionally determinative differences between corporations and indi-
viduals. 73 Thus, Austin suggests that the apparent broad holding of
Bellotti, equating corporate speech with individual speech, must be
wrong. In fact, the Austin Court's justifications for restrictions on cor-
porate candidate advocacy are virtually identical to the Bellotti dissent
arguments that as a general matter corporate speech should not be
entitled to the same level of constitutional protection that is accorded
by the First Amendment to individual speech.74
The Austin Court was well aware that individuals can accumulate
and invest in political advocacy "immense aggregations of wealth" 75
70. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
71. See generally id.
72. Id. at 660.
73. Id. at 659-60.
74. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 804-12 (White, J., dissenting).
75. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
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that are indistinguishable from corporate political advocacy expendi-
tures in terms of their "corrosive and distorting effects" 76 on public
political debate. And the Court was aware that individual political
advocacy expenditures were absolutely protected as core political
speech under Buckley.77 Thus, the Court in Austin explained its hold-
ing very carefully: "We emphasize that the mere fact that corporations
may accumulate large amounts of wealth is not the justification...
rather, the unique state-conferred corporate structure that facilitates
the amassing of large treasuries warrants the limit on independent
[corporate] expenditures. ' 78 The Court expanded on this key point as
follows:
State law grants corporations special advantages-such as limited
liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation
and distribution of assets-that enhance their ability to attract capi-
tal and to deploy their resources in ways that maximize the return
on their shareholders' investments. These state-created advantages
not only allow corporations to play a dominant role in the Nation's
economy, but also permit them to use "resources amassed in the
economic marketplace" to obtain "an unfair advantage in the politi-
cal marketplace." As the Court explained in MCFL, the political
advantage of corporations is unfair because "[tihe resources in the
treasury of a business corporation ... are not an indication of popu-
lar support for the corporation's political ideas. They reflect instead
the economically motivated decisions of investors and customers.
The availability of these resources may make a corporation a formi-
dable political presence, even though the power of the corporation
may be no reflection of the power of its ideas."'79
Thus, it seems clear that Austin effectively overruled the broad
holding in Bellotti. And because the broad holding in Bellotti was the
only available reasoning to support the actual or narrow holding in
Bellotti protecting corporate issue advocacy, it seems clear on reflec-
tion that Austin effectively overruled Bellotti's narrow holding by re-
moving its underlying rationale. Nothing in the Austin reasoning
quoted above confines that reasoning only to candidate elections
rather than the corporate issue advocacy protected by Bellotti.80 From
the point of view of doctrinal coherence, however, two separate but
closely related things went wrong in Austin.
First, Justice Marshall in Austin never explicitly overruled the broad
Bellotti holding nor even acknowledged the inconsistency between his
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 658-59 (quoting MCFL, 479 U.S. at 257-58).
80. See Dana, supra note 69, at 336-37.
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holding that corporate candidate advocacy was not protected and the
broad Bellotti principle that corporate speech and individual speech
were equivalent for constitutional purposes. The narrow holding in
Austin was that corporate candidate advocacy is not protected while
the real (or narrow) holding in Bellotti was merely that corporate issue
advocacy is protected. Thus, one can make the argument that Justice
Marshall could not technically "overrule" Bellotti in Austin. While
this argument is technically correct, it overlooks the fact that Bellotti
was, and still is viewed and cited as, an authoritative holding that cor-
porate speech is entitled to the same constitutional protection as indi-
vidual speech in all contexts. Justice Marshall could not have been
oblivious to this fact, and thus his failure to acknowledge the inconsis-
tency between his holding in Austin and the common understanding of
the holding in Bellotti was conspicuous to any informed observer.
That failure allowed pro-regulation advocates to ignore the Austin
reasoning, which suggested that Bellotti was overruled, and to insist
instead that Bellotti remained good law. And if the Bellotti
equivalency principle remained good law, then the Austin holding that
corporate candidate advocacy was not protected must then also apply
to individual candidate advocacy. In other words, it could be argued
that Austin, through Bellotti's equivalency principle, overruled Buck-
ley. Thus, if one ignores the Austin reasoning, the Austin holding left
the most fundamental Buckley principles open to re-examination and
rejection in the drafting of the BCRA.
The second problem for doctrinal coherence in Austin was that Jus-
tice Marshall did not (and technically could not) overrule the narrow
holding in Bellotti that corporate issue advocacy was protected. Be-
cause Austin involved only corporate candidate advocacy, Justice
Marshall could only "hold" that corporate candidate advocacy was un-
protected. He could not hold that corporate issue advocacy also was
unprotected, thus overruling Bellotti's narrow holding. All of Justice
Marshall's reasoning in Austin leading to the holding of "unpro-
tected," however, applied equally well to both corporate candidate ad-
vocacy (Austin) and corporate issue advocacy (Bellotti). Stated
another way, all of the reasoning in Bellotti, which formed the broad
holding, was equally applicable to both corporate issue advocacy (Bel-
lotti) and corporate candidate advocacy (Austin). When that reason-
ing (the broad holding in Bellotti) was explicitly rejected in Austin, the
narrow holding in Bellotti of protection for corporate issue advocacy
was left with no comprehensible rationale. Nonetheless, Justice Mar-
shall's opinion in Austin conspicuously failed to acknowledge that it
had removed all of the underlying rationale for the narrow Bellotti
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holding protecting corporate issue advocacy. This conspicuous failure
allowed pro-protection advocates to assert that Bellotti's holding pro-
tecting corporate issue advocacy was technically consistent with Aus-
tin's holding of no protection for corporate candidate advocacy.
This argument then made the distinction between issue ads and can-
didate ads the constitutionally determinative factor in whether a par-
ticular instance of corporate political advocacy expenditure was
protected. This distinction spawned a thoroughly disreputable body
of debate and judicial decisions attempting to distinguish between
protected "issue" ads that merely endorse a specific viewpoint on a
specific public issue (even if a particular candidate is advancing that
same view on that same issue in a current campaign) and unprotected
"express" ads that endorse the campaign of a particular candidate be-
cause of the candidate's stand on the public issue of interest to the
corporation. 81 The result of Austin then seemed to introduce a sev-
enth principle that was fundamentally inconsistent with the sixth prin-
ciple and which furthermore relied on an unworkable and
theoretically unsupported distinction between issue ads and candidate
ads: Corporate expenditures for issue advocacy are protected by the
Buckley-MCFL rules but corporate expenditures for candidate advo-
cacy are not protected.
F. Anticipating McConnell
In McConnell, the Court confronted a regulatory restriction on both
corporate issue advocacy (which was protected according to Bellotti)
and corporate candidate advocacy (which was not protected according
to Austin). The foregoing compilation of the Court's pre-McConnell
jurisprudence suggests that before attempting to reason from pre-Mc-
Connell principles, any opinion in McConnell at a minimum would be
forced to resolve the two issues presented by the seventh principle
from Austin. First, one would need to decide whether to preserve or
reject as unworkable and unprincipled the abstract distinction be-
tween corporate issue ads and corporate candidate ads. Because there
was no discernable distinction and because the Court's reasoning in
81. See Landell v. Vermont, 300 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2002); Va. Soc'y for Human Life, Inc. v.
FEC, 263 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2001); Perry v. Bartlett, 231 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 2000); FEC v. Chris-
tian Action Network, 110 F.3d 1049 (4th Cir. 1997). But see FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857 (9th
Cir. 1987). The drafters of the BCRA assumed or hoped that the Court would eliminate the
indefensible (after Austin) distinction between corporate issue advocacy and express advocacy
by holding that corporate expenditures for either form of election advocacy are unprotected. All
of the BCRA's restrictions on corporate expenditures for electioneering activity would then pass
constitutional muster. The decision in McConnell proved this hope or assumption to be well-
founded.
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Austin applied equally to both, one might have predicted that most
members of the Court would reject the distinction and apply the same
level of protection (if any) to both corporate issue advocacy and cor-
porate candidate advocacy.
That prediction, of course, would then focus attention squarely on
the question presented by the fundamental conflict between Austin
and Bellotti. Thus, it seemed unavoidable that each of the opinions in
McConnell would be forced either to accept the obvious implications
of Austin and explicitly overrule Bellotti or to overrule Austin in favor
of the broad Bellotti holding that corporate political advocacy is pro-
tected to the same extent as individual political advocacy. Neither of
the two other options (overruling Buckley or maintaining the distinc-
tion between issue ads and candidate ads) seemed very likely at this
point in the development of the Court's jurisprudence. In other
words, in McConnell, either Bellotti would be expressly overruled or
Austin would be expressly overruled as an unavoidable first step in
assessing the constitutionality of the BCRA's direct restrictions on all
forms of corporate political advocacy.
III. MCCONNELL V. FEC8 2
As one might have predicted, the five-vote majority in McConnell
easily rejected the discredited distinction between corporate issue ad-
vocacy and corporate candidate advocacy.83 The evidence was over-
whelming that no discernable difference between the two existed in
the real world of corporate political advocacy. 84 Drawing the distinc-
tion on the basis of the presence or absence of certain "magic words"
was patently arbitrary to the point of absurdity.8 5 And it was clear
82. 540 U.S. 93.
83. Id. at 126-29.
84. Id.
85. The Court in McConnell condemned the unworkable distinction in great detail:
While the distinction between "issue" and express advocacy seemed neat in theory,
the two categories of advertisements proved functionally identical in important re-
spects. Both were used to advocate the election or defeat of clearly identified federal
candidates, even though the so-called issue ads eschewed the use of magic words. Little
difference existed, for example, between an ad that urged viewers to "vote against Jane
Doe" and one that condemned Jane Doe's record on a particular issue before exhorting
viewers to "call Jane Doe and tell her what you think." Indeed, campaign professionals
testified that the most effective campaign ads, like the most effective commercials for
products such as Coca-Cola, should, and did, avoid the use of the magic words. Moreo-
ver, the conclusion that such ads were specifically intended to affect election results was
confirmed by the fact that almost all of them aired in the 60 days immediately preced-
ing a federal election. Corporations and unions spent hundreds of millions of dollars of
their general funds to pay for these ads, and those expenditures, like soft-money dona-
tions to the political parties, were unregulated under FECA. Indeed, the ads were
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that even the most explicit ad urging the election or defeat of a candi-
date could easily be recast as an issue ad that focused on the issues
that were central to a particular candidate's record or platform.86 Fi-
nally, it was established that the professionals who designed candidate
election advertising preferred the "issue" format over the "candidate"
format as a more effective form of candidate advertising even if the
"candidate" form had been constitutionally protected.87
A. Reduced Protection for Corporate Election Advocacy
The quick rejection of the distinction between corporate issue advo-
cacy and corporate candidate advocacy then focused attention on the
key question of the level of protection provided by the First Amend-
ment for all corporate political advocacy. 88 The majority answered
this central question simply by relying on Austin's core holding (now
without the residual distinction between issue ads and candidate ads)
that corporate political advocacy is not protected from regulatory re-
strictions that would be unconstitutional under Buckley if applied to
an individual's advocacy. 89 The majority simply reasoned from Austin
as its starting point, without the residual distinction between Austin
and Bellotti.90 Unfortunately, it did not expressly overrule, or even
acknowledge the existence of, Bellotti.
Once the majority adopted the implicit holding of Austin, that cor-
porate speech is not fully protected by the First Amendment, it fol-
lowed quickly that all of the BCRA's restrictions on both corporate
advocacy expenditures and corporate political contributions would be
found constitutional. Remember, contributions to candidates and co-
ordination of expenditures (by either corporations or individuals) al-
ready were unprotected under Buckley because regulating them
involved very little incidental restriction on speech.91 Now direct cor-
attractive to organizations and candidates precisely because they were beyond FECA's
reach, enabling candidates and their parties to work closely with friendly interest
groups to sponsor so-called issue ads when the candidates themselves were running out
of money.
Id. at 126-28 (footnotes omitted).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 127 n.18. The Court cited exhibits and briefs showing that during the 1998 election
cycle only four percent of candidate advertisements actually used words that appeared in the
famed "footnote 52" of Buckley. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 127 n.18; see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44
n.52. In 2000, a Presidential election year, the number rose to only five percent. McConnell, 540
U.S. at 127 n.18.
88. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 203-09.
89. Id. at 205.
90. Id.
91. See generally Buckley, 424 U.S. 1.
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porate speech, whether through independent advocacy expenditures
or through contributions to MCFL political advocacy groups, was un-
protected.92 In other words, it no longer mattered whether a particu-
lar corporate expenditure was treated as a contribution (direct
candidate contributions and coordinated expenditures) or as speech
(independent advocacy expenditures and contributions to political ad-
vocacy groups). All corporate political activity, whether it qualified as
speech or not, was subject to regulation. 93 The regulatory interest in
reducing the real or apparent corruption that continues to inhere in
large advocacy expenditures by individuals or corporations directed at
candidate elections was more than adequate to justify regulation of
corporate speech in candidate elections. 94 The regulatory interest in
leveling the playing field by reducing the effect of wealth was also
adequate to justify the restrictions on corporate advocacy expendi-
tures in the context of either candidate or issue elections.95 Those two
reasons remained inadequate, however, to justify restrictions on polit-
ical advocacy expenditures by individuals (and by MCFL not-for-
profit political advocacy corporations) because those expenditures re-
mained absolutely protected as core political speech under Buckley.
B. Reduced Protection for General Corporate Speech
On the fundamental question of the level of protection to be af-
forded corporate speech, the majority opinion is unsatisfactory in
three important respects. First, the majority did not explain clearly
that it was effectively overruling Bellotti or at least was recognizing
that Austin had effectively overruled Bellotti. It is true that the rea-
soning offered in Austin for not protecting the one class of corporate
advocacy (i.e., the state-created nature of a corporate entity) applied
with equal force to the other class of corporate advocacy that had
been protected by Bellotti. Thus, Austin clearly suggested that when
the unsound distinction was rejected, neither class of corporate advo-
cacy would be protected. But this approach effectively overruled Bel-
lotti without making that overruling explicit in either Austin or
McConnell. While such an implied overruling is not unheard of in the
Court's history, it is particularly problematic here. By simply reason-
ing from Austin after removing the distinction, the majority was able
to sustain all of the BCRA restrictions on corporate political advocacy
(as within the authority of Austin) without ever exploring what level
92. See generally McConnell, 540 U.S. 93.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 205.
95. Id.
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of constitutional protection might be appropriate for corporate speech
after Bellotti's sweeping absolutes are rejected. This shortcoming is
particularly problematic because Bellotti is the fountainhead of consti-
tutional protection for corporate speech in all contexts, not just elec-
tion advocacy. The implications of McConnell for the constitutional
protection of corporate speech in non-election contexts escaped any
exploration as a result of the majority's failure to explicitly acknowl-
edge overruling Bellotti somewhere between Austin and McConnell.
Note that this is not a criticism of the majority's overruling of Bel-
lotti or the result in McConnell that corporate political advocacy is not
protected from regulatory restrictions that would be unconstitutional
if applied to individuals. The reasoning in Austin on which the major-
ity apparently relies tracks the reasoning of the dissents in Bellotti and
establishes that corporate speech is not entitled to constitutional pro-
tection as a general proposition.96 But if that is what the majority in
McConnell meant, then they should have said so and not left us to
guess about the implications of McConnell for corporate speech gen-
erally. Of course, ideally Austin itself would have overruled Bellotti.
Since Austin preserved some vestige of arguable consistency with Bel-
lotti, and since the majority in McConnell stripped away that last ves-
tige of consistency, however, the majority in McConnell should have
explicitly acknowledged the overruling of Bellotti and given some gen-
eral sense of what standard of protection was to take its place. 97
The second problem with the Court's treatment of corporate politi-
cal speech in McConnell is that what little the Court did say on the
subject is not consistent with well-established free speech analytical
methodology. 98 The majority in McConnell purported to simply adopt
96. Even if corporate speech is not entitled to constitutional protection as such, it seems likely
that a viewpoint discriminatory regulation of corporate speech would still be found unconstitu-
tional. R.A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), seems to hold that classes of speech that are
excluded from First Amendment protection are nonetheless entitled to protection from view-
point discriminatory regulations. But see Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 343-44 (2003) (in which
the majority apparently rejected the dissenters' RAV-based argument that unprotected "true
threats" may not be restricted when they communicate disfavored political viewpoints while
other true threats remain unregulated).
97. The level of constitutional protection that corporate speech generally merits after Bellotti-
Austin-McConnell undoubtedly will be the subject of extended scholarly and judicial exploration
in the near future. At this point, it is clear only that McConnell must be understood as holding
that corporate political advocacy (and by implication, all corporate speech on subjects farther
from the core of the First Amendment) is not entitled to the same protection as that afforded to
individual speech. See generally McConnell, 540 U.S. 93.
98. At a minimum, this makes it difficult to use existing doctrine to reason out the implica-
tions of McConnell for corporate speech in other contexts. At worst, the Court's casual rhetoric
in McConnell will send future doctrinal development off in incoherent directions.
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and implement the holding and reasoning in Austin.99 As outlined
earlier in this Article's discussion of Austin, the Austin reasoning
tracks the arguments of the dissent in Bellotti. That reasoning leads to
the conclusion that because a corporation is a creature of the state,
created for limited purposes, its speech generally should not qualify
for First Amendment protection. Thus, one would have expected the
Court in McConnell to have concluded from the Austin reasoning that
corporate speech was indistinguishable from all other corporate activi-
ties that constitutionally can be regulated by the state on a showing of
a mere rational basis. And then one would have expected the Court
to conclude that the regulatory interests in reducing corruption and
reducing the "distorting" effects of wealthy advocates in public debate
easily met the deferential rational basis standard. 100 This line of rea-
soning then would have allowed one to deduce that corporate speech
in all other (non-election) contexts was similarly unprotected and
regulatable with a rational basis. But that is not what the Court in
McConnell said.
Citing Austin as its controlling authority, the Court in McConnell
articulated a time-place-manner analysis to conclude that the absolute
ban on corporate election advocacy did not prohibit, but merely bur-
dened corporate speech, and that the burden was justified by a com-
pelling governmental interest. 101 The key to this mischaracterization
of the regulatory restrictions was the Court's assertion that because a
corporation could facilitate the organization of a free standing, finan-
cially independent political action committee (PAC) that could then
fund election advocacy, the regulatory restrictions on corporate
speech were not a "complete ban" on a corporation's political
speech.10 2 The Court then "examine[d] the degree to which BCRA
burdens First Amendment expression."'01 3 Apparently concluding im-
plicitly that the burden was substantial, the Court proceeded to "eval-
uate whether a compelling governmental interest justifie[d] that
burden" and "easily answered" that question in the affirmative. 10 4
The compelling interest served by the regulation was the interest in
reducing "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggrega-
tions of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate
99. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 204-05.
100. Id. at 205.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 204.
103. Id. at 205.
104. Id.
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form." 10 5 Finally, the Court concluded that the regulation passed the
last step in a time-place-manner analysis because it was not "over-
broad"-that is, it did not burden more speech than necessary to ac-
complish its purpose. 10 6
The most charitable thing one could say about the Court's misrepre-
sentation of the regulation in McConnell and its invocation of the
time-place-manner analysis is that it is confused, but "dishonest"
probably would be a more accurate description. Although the Court
asserted that characterizing the regulation as a "complete ban" was
"simply wrong, '10 7 the restriction was in fact a complete ban on cor-
porate election advocacy. The Court's assertion to the contrary is it-
self "simply wrong." The fact that a separate financial entity, a PAC,
could be created and funded by some individuals associated with the
corporation does not make the ban on speech by the corporation any
less absolute. No corporate resources can be transferred to the sepa-
rate PAC, so the speech of the PAC can in no way be characterized as
the speech of the corporation. Furthermore, the express purpose of
the ban was precisely to prohibit speech by the corporate entity with
corporate resources. The Court's casual assertion that the PAC's
speech was simply an alternative form of speech by the corporation
itself is not just "simply wrong," it is astonishing.
Even if the complete ban on corporate election advocacy could
somehow accurately be described as a time-place-manner regulation
that left adequate alternative opportunities for the corporation to en-
gage in election advocacy, it still would not have passed an honest
time-place-manner analysis. Any apparent regulation of time-place-
manner with an actual purpose to impede or suppress the speech is
not treated as a time-place-manner regulation, but rather as a direct
or deliberate restriction on the speech. In a case involving core politi-
cal speech, such a regulation is a per se violation of the First Amend-
ment. Thus, the BCRA's explicit purpose to reduce the persuasive
impact of corporate speech in public debate surrounding an election
prevents the application of any honest time-place-manner analysis.
It is extremely difficult to figure out where this blatant misrepresen-
tation and misuse of the time-place-manner analysis by the Court in
McConnell leaves us with the question of constitutional protection for
corporate speech generally. If one accepts the Court's use of time-
place-manner analysis at face value, it implies that corporate speech
105. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 205 (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
106. Id. at 207.
107. Id. at 204.
10712005]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
remains fully protected under Bellotti. If Bellotti were not still good
law protecting corporate speech, the Court would not have needed to
invoke time-place-manner analysis to sustain the regulation. In other
words, the Court's invocation of time-place-manner analysis to sustain
the regulation in McConnell implies that Austin did not overrule Bel-
lotti's broad holding that corporate speech is protected to the same
extent as individual speech. On the other hand, the reasoning behind
the holding in Austin, which the Court cited as controlling authority in
McConnell, suggests that Bellotti has been overruled. And the Court's
reliance on time-place-manner analysis in McConnell to avoid explic-
itly overruling Bellotti is transparently defective, suggesting that cor-
porate speech in principle is not protected and Bellotti effectively is
overruled. This seems to leave the standard of constitutional protec-
tion for corporate speech in some sort of incoherent doctrinal limbo.
To say that further doctrinal clarification is required understates the
case quite seriously.
The necessity of doctrinal clarification will be forced on the Court
by subsequent cases involving direct state restrictions on corporate
speech concerning public issues in non-election contexts. 108 It is cer-
tain that the government in those cases will now cite Austin and Mc-
Connell for the fundamental principle that Bellotti has been overruled
and that corporate speech is not protected by the First Amendment.
It would follow then that corporate speech can be constitutionally reg-
ulated like all other corporate activities by a showing of a mere ra-
tional basis. If the Court rejects that extreme but logical inference
from Austin and McConnell, then it will be forced to describe a level
of constitutional protection for corporate political speech somewhere
between no protection at all and the absolute protection afforded in-
dividual political speech.10 9
As one possible course of future action, the Court could accept the
doctrinal result of McConnell without the flagrantly defective time-
place-manner rationale. The net result of McConnell is that a direct,
deliberate, total regulatory restriction on corporate political speech
108. See, e.g., Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
109. In a line of cases that began with Central Hudson Gas, the Court has held that commer-
cial speech (i.e., advertising) is entitled to a sort of mid-level First Amendment protection if it is
not misleading and concerns legal activity. See Cent. Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. 557; see also 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476
(1995). Virtually all commercial speech cases involve commercial speech by business corpora-
tions. If McConnell means that corporate speech as such can be regulated on the basis of some
standard less than that applied to the speech of individuals, then a regulation of the commercial
speech of a corporation will be constitutional if the regulation meets either the standard for
commercial speech or the as-yet-undetermined standard for corporate speech.
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was subjected to the compelling interest test where similar speech by
an individual would have been absolutely protected from such a direct
regulatory restriction. Thus, if one ignores the McConnell time-place-
manner reasoning, then McConnell stands for the principle that, un-
like individual speech, corporate speech is protected only by the com-
pelling interest test from direct regulatory restrictions designed to
suppress the speech. This approach would preserve and combine
pieces of Bellotti, Austin, and McConnell. Bellotti is preserved to the
extent that corporate speech is entitled to some constitutional protec-
tion, essentially for the reasons outlined in Bellotti. Austin is pre-
served to the extent that its reasoning (and the reasoning of the
dissent in Bellotti) explains why the protection for corporate political
speech is not as high as the absolute protection from direct restrictions
that is afforded to individual speech. Finally, McConnell is preserved
to the extent that it actually applied the compelling interest test to a
direct restriction on corporate political speech. This approach would
leave largely intact the results in virtually all of the non-election cor-
porate speech cases that have relied on Bellotti over the years, but it
would be necessary to recharacterize them as cases in which the state
failed to justify the regulation with a compelling interest.
If this is the doctrinal consequence of McConnell, the landscape of
constitutional protection for corporate political speech still will have
changed radically. All cases involving state regulation of corporate
speech on public issues will begin with the state's argument that Mc-
Connell stands for the principle that corporate speech can be directly
suppressed if the state can show a compelling interest to justify the
restriction. The state will then invoke as its compelling interest for
restricting corporate speech on the particular issue the compelling in-
terest accepted by the Court in McConnell: "[T]he corrosive and dis-
torting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are
accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little
or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political
ideas." 110 It is difficult to imagine why this same compelling interest
would not justify any state restriction on corporate advocacy on any
public issue. If the compelling interest test will be met in every case
by the same compelling interest that applies to all corporate advocacy
on every public issue, then the "protection" is only nominal. The net
effect would be that corporate speech is not actually protected from
state regulation, with the possible exception of viewpoint-discrimina-
110. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 205 (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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tory regulations. 1' We are then essentially back to the original impli-
cation of Austin: Corporate speech is not protected by the First
Amendment.
The third problem with the majority's unarticulated holding that
corporate speech is not entitled to the same level of constitutional
protection as individual political speech is that it depends on the prac-
tical workability of a theoretical distinction between traditional corpo-
rations (either for-profit or not-for-profit), whose speech is
unprotected under McConnell, and traditional incorporated political
advocacy associations, whose speech is protected under MCFL. A
further distinction seems to be required between non-MCFL media
corporations, whose speech presumably remains protected by the
speech and press clauses of the First Amendment," 2 and all other
non-MCFL corporations whose speech is not protected under Mc-
Connell. Distinguishing both MCFL corporations and media corpora-
tions from all other corporations may be sound in theory, but it is
likely to be devilishly difficult for the courts in practice.
At the outset, it is far from clear why the National Rifle Association
(NRA) does not fall immediately into the constitutionally protected
category of MCFL political advocacy corporations rather than into
the unprotected all-other-corporations category. While the NRA's
corporate activities include a wide variety of services for gun enthusi-
asts, it can be argued persuasively that the NRA's central purpose has
become the political campaign to preserve the legal right of individual
gun ownership. All of the NRA's other corporate activities depend
on the success of this central political mission, and even these other
activities can be characterized as a kind of "speech" advocating a lifes-
tyle of gun ownership and recreational use.
And if the NRA seems easy to categorize as a regulatable non-
MCFL corporation, what about the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People (NAACP)? It seems well established
that the speech of the incorporated NAACP is protected as the speech
111. See cases cited supra note 96 and accompanying text. But note that the viewpoint of
corporations on most public issues is entirely predictable and probably would be the real reason
that corporate speech on a particular public issue would be restricted. See Redish & Wasserman,
supra note 56, at 238.
112. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In contrast, see Justice Scalia's
Austin dissent, which argued that the majority's reasons for denying First Amendment protec-
tion to corporate political speech applied most forcefully to the political speech of economically
powerful media corporations. Austin, 494 U.S. at 691 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For a similar sug-
gestion, see Richard L. Hasen, Campaign Finance Laws and the Rupert Murdock Problem, 77
TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1653-54 (1999).
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of a political advocacy association. 113 Thus, the NAACP must qualify
after McConnell for MCFL corporation status. Yet the difference be-
tween the NAACP and the NRA in terms of the centrality of the po-
litical advocacy mission is extremely difficult to discern, much less to
define with precision. Though it seems inconceivable, McConnell's
narrow definition of the protected MCFL category"t 4 seems to raise a
question about the continued protection of the NAACP's political ad-
vocacy. At a minimum, the majority in McConnell has seriously un-
derestimated the difficulty of administering a critical distinction on
which its holding depends for legitimacy, and at worst the majority has
failed to provide constitutional protection for the core political speech
of incorporated associations of like-minded individuals joined in con-
scious and deliberate advocacy of their common political objectives.
The majority's definition of a protected MCFL corporation seems far
too narrow to protect core political speech and association, and in any
event, it will prove extremely difficult to administer.
If the distinction between an MCFL corporation and all other cor-
porations such as the NRA is not problematic enough, then where
exactly is the line between media corporations and all other non-
MCFL corporations? If the speech of media corporations remains
protected by the speech and press clauses in spite of their corporate
form and wealth, 115 then the Court will be forced to develop some
definitional criteria analogous to those that identify an MCFL corpo-
ration. And here the definitional task seems truly daunting. Starting
from one end of a spectrum that is composed of infinite factual varia-
tions, how many radio stations would the NRA need to acquire in
113. See generally Button, 371 U.S. 415; Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
114. The Court described the characteristics of a "MCFL organization" as follows:
"First, it was formed for the express purpose of promoting political ideas, and cannot
engage in business activities. If political fundraising events are expressly denominated
as requests for contributions that will be used for political purposes, including direct
expenditures, these events cannot be considered business activities. This ensures that
political resources reflect political support. Second, it has no shareholders or other
persons affiliated so as to have a claim on its assets or earnings. This ensures that
persons connected with the organization will have no economic disincentive for disasso-
ciating with it if they disagree with its political activity. Third, MCFL was not estab-
lished by a business corporation or a labor union, and it is its policy not to accept
contributions from such entities. This prevents such corporations from serving as con-
duits for the type of direct spending that creates a threat to the political marketplace."
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 210-11 (quoting MCFL, 479 U.S. at 264).
115. See, e.g., The N.Y. Times Co., Our Company, at http://www.nytco.com/company.html
(last visited Mar. 18, 2005). The New York Times Company had 3.3 billion dollars of revenue in
2004. Id. It owns nineteen newspapers, including the New York Times, the Boston Globe, and
the International Herald Tribune. Id. The company also owns eight network affiliated television
stations, two major New York area radio stations, and more than forty websites, and its stock is
regularly traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Id.
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order to qualify its speech for constitutional protection as the editori-
alizing of a media corporation? Or how large would the NRA's news-
letters and other publications need to become before the NRA
qualified for constitutional protection as "the press?" Starting from
the other end of the factual spectrum, how many subsidiary non-press
businesses (e.g., sale of T-shirts and coffee mugs, real estate holdings,
and rentals) could the New York Times Company pursue before it
moved from a protected media corporation into the unprotected "all-
other-corporations" category? And near the middle of the spectrum,
is a public relations firm or advertising agency an unprotected corpo-
ration or a protected media corporation? The definitional problem
seems insurmountable when one considers the modern reality of cor-
porate conglomerates and multiple levels of holding companies that
control both media and non-media subsidiaries. For example, is the
political speech of the Disney Corporation, in its many forms,
protected? 1 6
IV. CONCLUSION
Somewhere between Austin and McConnell, the Supreme Court has
rejected what is commonly cited as the "holding" in Bellotti that cor-
porate speech is entitled to the same level of protection as individual
speech. The McConnell holding contradicts Bellotti's fundamental
premise. Yet the Court has failed to acknowledge, much less explain,
the consequences of that implicit overruling for corporate speech in
the wide variety of non-election contexts. Further compounding the
confusion, the Court purported to explain the lack of protection for
corporate speech in McConnell by mischaracterizing the regulation
and invoking time-place-manner analysis to sustain the restriction.
Although the Court has succeeded, at least since Austin, in evading its
responsibility to produce a coherent doctrinal structure for the lower
courts and for the public, future cases involving state restrictions on
corporate speech in non-election contexts will force substantial doctri-
nal clarification. Whatever form that clarification ultimately takes, it
seems certain that corporate speech will no longer enjoy a level of
constitutional protection equivalent to the protection afforded to the
speech of individuals. The sweeping absolutes of Bellotti clearly are
no longer good law.
116. For some preliminary thoughts on how the distinction might be defined and defended,
see Greenwood, supra note 56, at 1060.
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